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Part I. 
Introduction 
Last year, the state of Tennessee took a radical measure in the ongoing “war” on female 
reproductive choice by enacting a statute making drug use by pregnant women a crime of 
aggravated fetal assault.1  Never before has a criminal statute so explicitly made fetuses legal 
victims of a mother’s conduct. Nor has any state’s criminal code ever established an independent 
drug use crime for this special class of “perpetrators.” Worse yet, the statute’s enforcement in 
Tennessee, as well as the emerging interpretation of fetal personhood in other states, disparately 
impacts minority women - the subset of American society already most vulnerable to socio-
economic marginalization.2  
Academic treatment has mostly utilized reproductive rights advocacy as its tool for 
constructing legal arguments against this nefarious expansion of state intrusion. This paper 
examines the threat to female sexual autonomy through the Reproductive Justice (RJ) 
framework,3 but also contends that expanded criminalization of pregnancy conduct has emerged 
within a greater complex of state action that systematically subordinates targeted segments of the 
population to serve capitalist and political self-interest.  
After demonstrating the pathological nature of the issue at hand, this paper will propose 
solutions that circle back to the familiar: federal judiciaries should defeat the criminalization of 
                                                                 
1 See Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 39-13-107 & 39-13-214 (West 2014) 
2 American Civil  Liberties Union, New Bill Would Criminalize Drug Use by Pregnant Women, at 
http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2015/03/18/new-bill-will-criminalize-drug-use-by-pregnant-women/ 
3 Reproductive Justice is a social movement concerned with the impact that reproductive jurisprudence and 
legislation bears on poor women and women of color and views policies adverse to the interests of this subset of 
women as a human rights issue to be addressed accordingly. See SisterSong Women of Color Collective at 
http://www.sistersong.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=66 (last visited on April  
27, 2015) 
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pregnant women on constitutional grounds, and Congress should enact laws that prohibit the 
expansion of drug interdiction towards pregnant women. Finally, social justice movements like 
RJ should find expand their activism to include broader critiques towards broader systemic 
issues that promote class inequality and, as a result, race and gender subordination. 
Part I of this paper first narrates the inconsistent development of reproductive rights in 
the U.S. with reproductive choice as its core issue. Part I then introduces Reproductive Justice, a 
progressive movement that challenges mainstream feminism in part by outing abortion fetish as 
narrow and exclusionary.4 The RJ framework, which incorporates intersectionality5 and social 
justice analysis, will also be used in subsequent sections to support links made between social 
exclusion, the State’s use of targeted criminalization, and justifications for solutions that I 
propose. 
Part II begins by outlining socio-economic data reflecting the “double jeopardy” of 
gender and race subordination confronting women of color as well as class oppression in a social 
order that yields its greatest benefits to men and the middle class. 
 Part II then transitions into an analysis of governmental drug interdiction and 
prosecution during the so called “Drug War” instituted by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and the 
devastating impact suffered by large minority communities as a result.6 A crucial nexus will be 
formed linking the Government’s political interests and overtly racist policies that erased large 
swaths of minority men from urban areas and similar legal strategies that are now threatening 
pregnant women of color, and by extension, families and communities of color. 
                                                                 
4 Kristin Luker, Annual Review of Law and Science, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 327, 336 (quoting 
Marlene Gerber Fried, From Abortion to Reproductive Freedom: Transforming a Movement (1990)). 
5 Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs' Was A "War on 
Blacks", 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 445 (2002) (discussing the impact the “War on Drugs” had on minority 
communities). 
6 Id. 
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Part III surveys the amalgam of new laws and practices that ensnares low income women 
of color into the artificial “War on Drugs with special attention to the recent Tennessee 
legislation that, for the first time, explicitly makes pregnancy drug use an independently 
recognized crime.   
Finally, Part IV will suggest modes of redressing state legislation and the enforcement of 
these toxic criminalization projects. Strategies will include Constitutional arguments leveraging 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Doctrine, Equal Protection, and Search and Seizure 
jurisprudence. Each will be taken in turn. The Conclusion will crystalize this paper’s thesis and 
the main tenets of the analysis herein. 
Part I.  
Cycles of Female Sexual Autonomy: From Reproductive Rights to Reproductive Justice  
The national and even academic discourse on reproductive rights has long trained its 
focus on abortion, myopically framing the issue in terms of women’s choice to terminate 
pregnancy.7 Some contemporary advocates of female autonomy in sexual and reproductive 
health, however, are properly expanding the movement to include freedom within reproduction – 
the rights of women during pregnancy and childbirth – as part of a broader Reproductive Justice 
(RJ) concept aimed at disassembling dominant social structures that continue to impact the most 
vulnerable members of society: poor women and women of color.8  
 
 
 
                                                                 
7Elizabeth Kukura, Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to Vbac, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 955, 956 (2010) (discussing 
mainstream feminist scholarship’s focus on abortion rights). 
8 Id. 
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A. Historical Development of Reproductive Rights in the U.S. 
The development of reproductive rights in the U.S. has its roots in the lenient British 
common law regulating abortion.9 Historically in England, women could choose to abort their 
fetuses with little sanction before “quickening,” the moment at which the fetus begins to exhibit 
independent movement - believed to occur at some point towards the end of the first trimester.10 
This cautiously deferential view towards female reproductive autonomy appears to have been 
adopted by this nation in its infancy.11 Over time, however, states began to enact more stringent 
prohibitions on early term abortions. Perhaps leveraging puritanical sentiment and fear of 
interracial mixing, these states seized control of female reproductive organs as statutes, case law, 
and the mainstream medical profession together propelled the swift eradication of female 
reproductive and sexual autonomy.12  
Social values liberalized, however, during the prosperous post WWII period as the Civil 
Rights movement and Feminist advocacy gained momentum. In its 1973 decision Roe v. Wade, 
the Supreme Court followed the reversal of anti-abortion sentiment among the general public and 
the medical community. The landmark decision established a right of female choice in 
                                                                 
9 See Dorland's Il lustrated Medical Dictionary 1261 (24th ed. 1965) (discussing historical British Common Law 
regarding abortion). 
10 For discussions of the role of the “quickening” concept in English common law, See Means, The Law of New York 
Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Fetus, 1664- 1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality (pt. 1), 14 
N.Y.L.F. 411, 418-428 (1968). 
11 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140, L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973); (Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority: “It is thus 
apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion 
of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in 
effect.”). 
12 Id. (“The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical 
profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have played a significant role in the enactment of stringent 
criminal abortion legislation during that period.”) 
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controlling their bodies and their pregnancies up until some ambiguous point of fetal viability.13 
Justice Blackmun, writing the majority opinion of the Court, postulated: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal 
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in 
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a 
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.14 
 
 Despite trending national sentiment in favor of women’s choice in pregnancy, the Roe 
decision polarized constituencies across the country as opposition activists accused an unelected 
Court of exceeding its authority.15 Even advocates of women’s reproductive choice like future 
Justice Ruth Ginsberg, who wrote an amicus brief in Roe, contemporaneously warned that the 
movement would have been better served by the Court merely striking down the disputed Texas 
statute as unconstitutional rather than establishing a national precedent that effectively legalized 
abortion under a tenuous trimester framework.16 She argued that by invalidating the statute, other 
state legislatures would have continued to legalize reproductive choice without animating the 
opposition’s base. 
In subsequent decades, many states applied restrictive schemes in an effort to pacify the 
swell of political unrest caused by Roe, including required informed consent requirements, 
parental notification, and restrictions on late-term abortions.17 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
the Court re-empowered states to regulate abortion so long as the restriction does not place an 
“undue burden” on women’s elective privilege, elaborating that the “burden” should not “place a 
                                                                 
13Id. (The Court established a precarious trimester framework which has since been used to justify ab ortion 
limitations and fetal personhood ideals. These consequences will  be considered in Part III of this paper.).  
14 Id.  
15 Ruth Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. LAW REV. 375 
(1985) ("The political process was moving in the early 1970s, not swiftly enough for advocates of quick, complete 
change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to 
justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict."). 
16 Id. 
17 Guttmacher Institute, An Overview of Abortion Laws, as of March 1, 2012, at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/sections/abortion. 
8 
 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.” 18Another blow to reproductive 
rights came in Carhart II (2003), where the Supreme Court upheld the federal Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003. The Court held that Congress was within its authority to regulate 
certain types of abortions where medical science was divided as to the efficacy of the particular 
procedure in question.19 Casey and Carhart II have since formed the jurisprudential basis for a 
greater regulatory movement in restricting abortions after the first trimester.20 At least thirty-nine 
states now impose significant restrictions beyond fetal gestation at 24 weeks.21 
The Supreme Court is not alone in corroding reproductive choice. The Hyde Amendment, 
originally passed in 1976, but subsequently altered to its most restrictive form in the early 1980s, 
prohibits the use of federal funding in the completion of abortions.22 In Harris v. McRae, the 
Supreme Court sustained the Act, holding that it does not facially eliminate a women’s 
fundamental right to an abortion, but simply requires all women to self-finance the “elective” 
procedure.23 Not surprisingly, Medicaid participants of which women of color rely upon more 
than men or non-Hispanic white women, and other low income women are most severely 
affected.24 
B. Towards Reproductive Justice: Intersectionality and Reproductive Autonomy 
In the throes of the above chronicled fight for abortive choice, philosopher and feminist 
Marlene Fried issued the following attack on the entrenched reproductive rights movement: “the 
                                                                 
18Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992). 
19 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 167 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2007). 
20 See Guttmacher Institute, State Policies on Later Abortions, as of March 1, 2012, at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/sections/abortion.  
21 Id. 
22 Allison Stevens, Hyde’s Exit Leaves his Amendment Open to Challenge, Women’s eNews, Jan. 7, 2007. See also 
http://www.guttmacher.org. 
23 Harris  v McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
24 Allison Stevens, Hyde’s Exit Leaves his Amendment Open to Challenge, Women’s eNews, Jan. 7, 2007. See also 
http://www.guttmacher.org. 
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decision to fight for choice rather than justice is itself a decision to appeal to those who already 
have choices.”25 Fried’s conclusion reflects a central tenet of Reproductive Justice (RJ) 
advocacy: that mainstream feminism’s almost exclusive concern with abortion skews 
reproductive politics towards both the self-serving interests of middle class women and the 
maternalistic imposition of the same group’s social concerns on poor women and women of 
color. 
During approximately the same time, critical race theorist and legal scholar Kimebrle 
Crenshaw, credited with introducing the concept of intersectionality to academic scholarship,  
argued that women of color in general, and black women in particular, occupied an ultra-
subordinated space with respect to legal contexts and social movements. 26 The marginalization 
and exclusion of this subset of women inevitably produced “an actual experience of domestic 
violence, rape, and remedial reform qualitatively different than that of white women.” 27  
Crenshaw concluded that legal solutions to both gender and racial oppression simultaneously 
suffered by a single group should address the matrix of pressures at the intersection of these 
forces. 
Applying the critical theory scholarship of the late 1980s and early 1990s discussed 
above, the Reproductive Justice movement took prominence through the formation of the 
SisterSong Collective in 1997. It’s articulation of the movement is as follows:  
Reproductive Justice … provides an intersectional framework that allows us to include all the 
social justice and human rights issues that affect our lives. This can be done without segmenting, 
isolating, and pitting one priority against another. The reproductive justice framework – the right 
to have children, not have children, and to parent the children we have in safe and healthy 
environments -- is based on the human right to make personal decisions about one’s life, and the 
                                                                 
25 Kristin Luker, Annual Review of Law and Science, Reproductive Justice, 9 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 327, 336 
(quoting Marlene Gerber Fried (1990), From Abortion to Reproductive Freedom: Transforming a Movement).  
26 "Intersectionality: The Double Bind of Race and Gender", interview with Kimberlé Crenshaw, American Bar 
Association, spring 2004. 
27 Id. 
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obligation of government and society to ensure that the conditions are suitable for implementing 
one’s decisions.28 
 
Accordingly, SisterSong and Reproductive Justice avoids focusing on the narrow issue of 
abortion and incorporates an “analysis of racial, economic, and structural constraints” on 
power.29 Recognizing that gender status operates within a complex of further subordinated 
identities, which prominently include race and class, RJ addresses a broader scope of 
reproductive challenges that impact the most vulnerable and comprehensively marginalized 
members of society: poor women of color. 
Reproductive Justice scholars are concerned with include sterilization practices within the 
U.S. and abroad, access to reproductive healthcare, and finally the disproportionate and 
oppressive criminalization of pregnant women by statute and practice that works spectacular 
hardships on poor women of color significantly more than those suffered by white, middle class 
women.30  
While RJ raises intersectional issues largely ignored within fight for female reproductive 
autonomy, many jurisdictions continue to regulate pregnancy through prosecutorial tactics and 
enactment of legislation.31 These will be discussed in the sections that follow. 
Part II. 
Social Status of Women of Color and State Attacks on Minority Existence 
This section will first establish women of color as a particularly unique subset of the 
body politic, excluded and subjugated in ways not explained by gender subordination alone. 
                                                                 
28 The SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective at http://www.sistersong.net (last visited on 
April  27, 2015). 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 See Infra Parts II and III  
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Criminalization of low income and minority life by means of “Drug War” policies and practices 
will then be examined in subsection B.  
A.  Social Marginalization of Women of Color 
Women of color notoriously suffer wage, education, and health access gaps as well as 
exclusion from the political process at much higher rates than their white female counterparts.32 
Systemic bias (targeted prosecutions, and sentencing disparities for drug violations), structural 
impediments (involuntary prenatal screening at public, low-income hospitals) and outright 
racism produces socio-political disenfranchisement, and makes women of color more susceptible 
to sexual regulation and reproductive control from the state.33 
 Women in the workforce make 77 cents for every dollar the average male worker makes. 
Black women and Latina women make 70 and 61 cents to that same male dollar respectively.34  
While the wage disparity may be closer under an equal pay for equal work calculus, the actual 
gap illustrated by the data above reflects stratified economic conditions likely triggered by 
opportunity inequities for different “classes” of women in our society.   
 Black and Latina women also experience greater unemployment than white women. In 
2012, Black and Latina women were unemployed at rates of 13.3 and 11.4 percent respectively, 
compared to the 7.2 percent rate of unemployment for white women.35 
 Worse yet, women of color overwhelmingly populate the ranks of Americans living in 
poverty.36 According to U.S. Census Bureau, the poverty rate for non-Hispanic whites in 2010 
was 9.9 percent, while Blacks and Hispanics rated at 27.4 and 26.6 percent respectively. 
                                                                 
32 Center for American Progress, The State of Women of Color in the United States, as of July 17, 2012 at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/race/issues/report. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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Households led by single mothers – a population segment dominated by women of color – 
suffered a 31.6 percent poverty rate, over three times the national average for white 
households.37  
This poverty disparity underscores the intersectional character of gender and race 
oppression. Poverty does not occur in a vacuum. Moreover, it is a root cause for education gaps 
that produce the employment and wage disparities outlined above. Poverty also results in limited 
access to health care and exposure to exploitive state practices like underfunding of abortion and 
limited reproductive health support, and invasive screening at public health institutions that often 
serve as proxies for state law enforcement.38  
While the above data suggests approximately one in three women of color live in 
poverty, it is not a stretch to conclude that many more live just above the poverty line. Social 
Welfare Reform in the mid-90s excluded over 3 million families from cash assistance programs 
and overall welfare caseloads have dropped 60 percent since 1996, when the “Welfare Reform” 
Act was passed.39 As social welfare for the neediest fell, advocacy groups reported that poor 
women and women of color became increasingly trapped in violent relationships and otherwise 
exploitive settings such as immigrant women trafficking and forced sex work.40 Indeed the 
American Bar Association contends that African American women suffer a 35 percent greater 
risk of domestic violence than their white female counterparts, and that black women risk death 
as a result of intimate partner violence more than any other racial group.41 The Southwest Center 
                                                                 
37 Id. 
38 See Stevens, supra note 22. 
39 Diana Brazzell, Welfare Reform at 15, The Policy Brief, Aug. 25, 2011, http://the 
policybrief.wordpress.com/2011/08/25/welfare-reform-at-15/. See also Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act. 
40 Legal Momentum, Welfare Reform at Age 15, A Vanishing Safety Net For Women and Children, April  2011, at 7, 
http: legalmomentum.org/our-work/women-and-poverty. 
41 American Bar Association Commission on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Domestic Violence Statistics, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/domestic_violence/resources/statistics.html . Last visited on March 17, 2015. 
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for Law and Policy reports that Native American women are victims of rape or sexual assault at 
more than the double the rate of any other group.42 Finally, the Georgetown Journal for Poverty 
Law and Policy recently published that 48 percent of Latina women reported an increase in 
domestic violence abuse after emigrating to the U.S. from their much poorer home countries,43 a 
striking indictment on social conditions for low-income immigrant women in the U.S. 
 But socio-economic data alone does not convey the depth of injustice suffered by women 
in minority communities. The under-policing of major crimes in poor urban neighborhoods44 
makes black and Latina women both more vulnerable to violent crimes and “invisible” as victims 
seeking remedy and protection. In her 2015 book Ghettoside: A True Story of Murder in 
America, award winning L.A. Times investigative journalist Jill Leovy chronicles the story of the 
“Grim Sleeper,” a serial killer who terrorized black women in Los Angeles’s South side over a 
19 year period starting in 1988. DNA evidence conclusively links the killer to eleven murders 
and one attempted murder, but the prevalence of substantially similar modus operandi (M.O.), 
and other evidence strongly suggest his involvement in dozens of other unsolved killings during 
the same period. Leovy surveys similar patterns of police neglect in black communities over the 
past century while demonstrating a startling contrast to the types of aggressive law enforcement 
otherwise affecting the very same neighborhoods. Her analysis shows that while police are 
willing and “successful” at “randomly” stopping petty drug possessors and parole violators in 
their aggressive “sweeps” of poor areas, they have been much less interested in investigating 
                                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Mary Dutton, Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Services Needs of Battered Immigrant 
Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, Georgetown Journal of Poverty and Law Policy, at 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/victims/pdf/women_of_color_network_facts_domestic_violence_2006.pdf. 
44 JILL LOEVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA, (2014). 
14 
 
major crimes that victimize members of the same. Mistrust builds and “street justice” produces a 
cycle of increased crime.45  
 Loevy also details outrage from the Black Coalition Fighting Black Serial Murders, who 
in 1989 demanded that the killings be given higher priority.46 The police declined to respond and 
made no public announcement regarding the killings, and the perpetrator went into apparent 
hiding.47 When similar murders targeting black female prostitutes on L.A.’s south side, involving 
the same M.O. surfaced in 2002, renewed demands were made on the LAPD.48 Even after DNA 
evidence concluded that the same serial murderer had committed the crimes, L.A.’s mayor and 
chief of law enforcement waited four months to alert the community their findings.49 While a 
suspect was finally arrested in 2014,50 the case remains open, an outrage to a community seeking 
justice for over 27 years. 
Structural and systemic pathologies can, and should, be examined to explain and resolve 
the severe social conditions that many women of color experience – including depressed 
employment opportunity, restricted access to health and education, and greater exposure to 
poverty, violence and exploitation as demonstrated in the data above. It is sufficient for the 
purposes of this paper, however, to establish that women of color have been relegated to the 
deepest socio-economic margins and are therefore more vulnerable to state discipline fueled by 
class based obsession over certain types of drug use and users. This group is also susceptible to 
alienation from their children in paternalistic regimes that aim to dictate the terms of motherhood 
and personal conduct.  
                                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
15 
 
 
B. The Drug War: Social Inequality and Related Pathologies 
In a radio address during October of 1982, acting U.S. president Ronald Reagan declared 
the government’s official “War on Drugs.”51 Reagan spoke in military rhetoric, promising a 
“planned, concerted, campaign,” using terms like “battle,” “war,” and “surrender.”52 Former 
president Eisenhower’s warning of a rising “Military Industrial Complex” instantly took on 
eerily foreboding dimension. What ensued was a highly organized, painstakingly marketed, 
military styled attack on common drug use and petty trafficking even as national consumption 
had been trending downwards since the late 1970s.53 In the following decades, mass 
incarceration and historically long sentences brought millions of so called offenders to “justice” 
as subsequent presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton enhanced resources and aggression 
to the juggernaut movement.54 The victims were predictable: young, urban, black men.55 
Numerous studies have tracked the explosion of black male incarceration during the two 
decades since the inception of Reagan’s “Drug War.” One such study reported that “between 
1976 and 1989 ‘the total number of drug arrests of Caucasians grew by seventy percent, 
compared to a four hundred and fifty percent increase among African Americans, and that the 
number of Caucasians incarcerated for drug offenses increased by fifty percent from 1986 to 
1991, while the number of African Americans incarcerated increased by three hundred and fifty 
                                                                 
51 See Reagan, In Radio Talk, Vows Drive Against Drugs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, at 1:38. 
52 Id. 
53 Kenneth B. Nunn, RACE, CRIME AND THE POOL OF SURPLUS CRIMINALITY: OR WHY THE "WAR ON DRUGS' WAS A "WAR ON 
BLACKS", 6 J. Gender Race & Just. 381, 445 (2002) (The article notes that drug use was more pervasive by large 
segments of the white community in the 1960s and 70s, but had begun to subside by the late 70s. Not 
coincidentally, Reagan’s “War on Drugs” to root when crack cocaine became prevalent in black communities. The 
conclusion is that the government’s interest in large-scale drug prosecution only emerged as use had subsided in 
the white community but increased in the black community, making it both politically feasible and a convenient 
tool of race subordination.). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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percent.”56 Even more alarming was the population of black males at diametrically opposite 
institutions during approximately the same period. By 1997, the number of black males 
incarcerated in prisons and jails for drug possession over the previous decade (791,280) 
exceeded those attending colleges or universities (579,800).57 
“Drug War” advocates argued that African American males break drug laws at higher 
rates and therefore faced incarceration at correspondingly greater per capita rates. The data does 
not support this contention, however. The U.S Health Service and Substance Abuse 
Administration, a government agency, reported in 1992 that 76 percent of drug users in the 
United States were white, while 14 percent were African American and eight percent Latino.58 
Since possession is an element of most drug crimes, patterns of arrest and incarceration 
disparities required more rigorous analysis of the policies and enforcement strategies that 
manifested those disparities.  
University of Florida Law professor Kenneth Nunn posits a theory of “disproportionate 
enforcement” as an explanation of the racial disparities that exist in drug incarcerations.59 In his 
now famous law review article Why the ‘War on Drugs’ was a War on Blacks, Nunn argues that 
in urban areas where law enforcement routinely utilize racial profiling tactics, they also have 
easier access to street level offenders in “socially disorganized neighborhoods” because “drug 
dealing is more likely to occur on the streets” while transient drug buyers, both black and white, 
are “less likely to draw attention to themselves.” 60 Professor Nunn also links social 
                                                                 
56 D.J. Si lton, U.S. PRISONS AND RACIAL PROFILING: A COVERTLY RACIST NATION RIDES A VICIOUS CYCLE, 20 L. & Ineq. 53, 61 
(2002). 
57 See Marc Mauer, The sentencing project, Americans Behind Bars: The International Use of Incarceration, 1992 -
93, at 18 (1994) 
58 See Micheal Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Neglect in America, Oxford Press (1995) 
59  
60 Supra, Nunn, Note 53. 
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disorganization and street level crime to chronic unemployment in a modern capitalist system 
that has increasingly produced income and wealth inequality along class as well as racial lines.61 
Former law professor, criminologist, and legal scholar Michael Tonry more pointedly 
blames the architects of “Drug War” policies in what he calls a campaign of “malignant neglect.” 
According to Tonry, presidential committees, legislatures, and the federal sentencing 
commission all knew or should have known the effects of an overly supply-oriented approach to 
drug interdiction. As Nunn describes, supply reduction strategies seek to reduce the availability 
of drugs by limiting access to drugs sources and “increasing the risk of drug possession and 
distribution.”62 An externality of this strategy is the increased incentives for young, low-status 
men in these communities to compete for accelerated profit margins in the high risk, high reward 
market that is a bi-product of the over-policing of drug supply.  
In his book, Malign Neglect: Race Crime and Punishment in America, Tonry outlines the 
declining drug use within the general white population that corresponded with rates of sustained 
drug use in black urban communities in the early 1980s. Consequently the conditions for 
political approval for a renewed drug purge provided a convenient “enemy,” a requirement of 
any “war” whether real or contrived. Tonry’s own words are compelling: 
The white-shirted-and-suspendered officials of the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy understood the arcane intricacies of NIDA surveys, Drug Use Forecasting and the Drug 
Abuse Warning Network better than anyone else in the United States. They knew that drug abuse 
was falling among the vast majority of the population. They knew that drug use was not 
declining among disadvantaged members of the urban underclass. They knew that the War on 
Drugs would be fought mainly in the minority areas of American cities and that those arrested 
and imprisoned would disproportionately be young blacks and Hispanics.63 
 
                                                                 
61 Id. 
62 See Micheal Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Neglect in America , Oxford Press (1995) 
63 Id. 
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 While resources and policy focus has shifted from drug law creation and enforcement to 
the “War on Terror” since September Eleventh, drug prosecution and mass incarceration have 
sustained as prominent features of the U.S. criminal justice system.  
Civil Rights litigator and legal scholar Michelle Alexander updates the racial disparities 
in drug prosecution and incarceration rates in her recent book, The New Jim Crow.64 Alexander 
reports that the U.S. prison population grew from 300,000 in the early 1980s to nearly 3,000,000 
in 2012.65 As a result, the U.S. has the fastest growing incarceration rate in the world, and we 
imprison our population at a rate more than eight times our industrialized peers.66  
Why the obsession? Alexander argues that it is the entrenched, mostly white and 
capitalist policy makers who fashioned a response to the promise of class equality and racial 
opportunity after both WWII and the Civil Rights movement.67 She also notes corresponding 
jurisprudence that has seen an increase in political involvement of corporations while minority 
communities have become increasingly removed from the political process.68 Criminalization 
projects powered mainly by drug related law enforcement contribute to this condition.  
In her historical analysis, Alexander chronicles The Reagan Administration’s knowledge 
of the Nicaraguan Contra’s cocaine distribution in the United States as a means of funding the 
U.S. backed opposition of Nicaragua’s socialist uprising.69 The corresponding flooding of poor 
urban markets with cheap cocaine is now seen as a contributing factor in the emergence of 
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“crack,” the low-income cocaine form of choice, contemporaneously featured in Reagan’s “Drug 
War.”70  
Finally, Alexander surveys contemporary data that shows sustained mass incarceration 
trends even as the government’s investment in the “War on Drugs” has shifted to the also 
fictitious “War on Terror.”71  She reports that black and Latino men are 25 times more likely to 
be arrested for drug possession than white male drug possessors and that 75 percent of drug 
prosecutions involve defendants of color. This is true despite continued evidence of greater drug 
use among white Americans.  Alexander prognosticates that, given current rates of prosecution, 
incarceration, and sentence length, the U.S. Criminal Justice System will incarcerate one-third of 
the entire African American population at some point within the next two decades. 72 
Commentators can certainly dispute the factors that contributed to our current crisis of 
mass incarceration. Indeed, the role of the state apparatus in knowingly and willingly producing 
the world’s largest per capita population of the imprisoned can also be debated. Perhaps 
concentrations of capital and wealth require such conditions as surplus labor and social control 
effectively alienate the “losers” of our economic system.73  
It is predictable that the same strategies of drug prosecution, which low-income men of 
color are susceptible to, will be used to force and maintain women, particularly of low socio-
economic means, to the social margins. As a result, the dual purposes of race and gender 
subordination are served, as will be further discussed in the sections that follow.  
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Part III. 
Tennessee’s “Fetal Assault” Statute  and Similar Sate Actions 
The ramifications of Tennessee’s recent fetal assault statute are dramatic. While the 
National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW) reports that thirty-eight states had previously 
utilized child endangerment statutes to prosecute similar conduct, most appellate courts properly 
rejected the use of laws which never contemplated fetuses as victims.74 Tennessee’s statute 
avoids this fate by bringing pregnant women and fetuses directly within its scope as separate, and 
more importantly, adversarial parties suitable for regulation.  
A. Background 
Justice Ginsberg’s warning of political backlash after Roe manifested most creatively in 
the use of child endangerment statutes to prosecute expecting mothers for drug use and other 
conduct deemed to promote poor birth outcomes.75 Fetuses suddenly became the uncontemplated 
victims of laws that were intended to protect independently living children from parental 
misconduct.  
California was the first state to attempt this kind of statutory manipulation in 1977 when 
it charged Margaret Reyes, a poor Latina women, with felony child endangerment for personal 
drug use during her pregnancy.76 Ms. Reyes was convicted at trial but the California Court of 
Appeals overturned the disposition, holding that fetuses did not meet the intended statutory 
definition of “child.”77 This result did not dissuade prosecutors in jurisdictions more politically 
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eager to stem abortion and female sexual autonomy. Many states, especially in the South, began 
prosecuting drug use under similar statutes, but met with similar fates at appellate review.78 
Two decades later, South Carolina became the first state to successfully prosecute and 
sustain a criminal conviction of pregnancy drug use in Whitner v. State.79 Whitner, a poor 
African American women, was referred to state law enforcement by a public hospital after her 
newborn tested positive for cocaine.80 The baby was delivered at full-term and showed no 
outward signs of poor health.81 After conviction and appellate reversal, South Carolina’s 
Supreme Court did the extraordinary: it became the first state to expand its definition of “child” 
under its endangerment and abuse statue to include “viable fetus.”82 
The impact of South Carolina’s unprecedented judicial activism was immediate. The 
invention of legal personhood for fetuses represented a success for conservative pro-life 
movements insistent on eradicating female choice in pregnancy altogether. Recognizing legal 
status for fetuses as separate from the pregnant women’s body is a significant step towards that 
end. Whitner’s conviction is also instructive in that a poor black woman, subjected to the care of 
a public health institution acting as an agent for law enforcement, was the most convenient target 
of South Carolina’s conservative political orientation regarding female reproductive choice.        
 Whitner follows the formula at issue in this paper: i) a woman of color, ii) at or near 
poverty, iii) treated by an impersonal, public institution in a conservative jurisdiction, iv) willing 
to screen and share private medical records with law enforcement, v) is prosecuted her for child 
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abuse, vi) by using an endangerment statute that never contemplated unborn children as victims 
under the law. 
Since Whitner, some states continue to successfully sustain similar convictions, although 
appellate courts in most jurisdictions still recognize these prosecutions as abusive 
misinterpretations of child endangerment statutes.83 
Fetal homicide laws and prosecutions have also shaped the national discourse on female 
reproductive autonomy. Historically, fetal protection in this context has focused on harm 
inflicted by third parties.84 For example, In 1984 Massachusetts became the first state to 
successfully impose criminal sanction for ending fetal viability while in utero under its vehicular 
homicide statute.85 In the past two decades, thirty-eight states have enacted some form of fetal 
homicide laws, according to the National Conference of State Legislator’s database.86 While 
specific provisions vary, the constitutional personhood of fetuses is recognized in some aspect by 
all of these statutes.  
Strikingly, twenty-three of the thirty-eight jurisdictions have expanded protection to 
include a fetus at any stage of viability. In Alabama, for instance, the statute defines "person," for 
the purpose of criminal homicide or assaults, to include “an unborn child in utero at any stage of 
development, regardless of viability,” but conveniently provides that “nothing in the act shall 
make it a crime to perform or obtain an abortion that is otherwise legal.”87 Although this statute 
consciously avoids conflict with Roe’s remaining principle, that no law shall altogether prohibit a 
women’s choice to terminate pregnancy, it is no accident that Alabama blatantly affords full 
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legal status to fetuses upon inception. Alabama is one of a handful of jurisdictions, mostly in the 
pro-life, politically conservative South, that is on the cutting edge of fetal rights activism. These 
states seem part of a concerted effort to establish full constitutional personhood for fetuses so 
that future abortion jurisprudence may more easily bend towards outright prohibition on the basis 
of these new “persons.” Indeed, Alabama recently established the right of independent legal 
counsel in family court proceedings for fetuses, an unheard of expansion of fetal recognition and 
outright attack on the women carrying those fetuses.88  
Advocates of statutory feticide provisions argue that harsher penalties should deter and 
provide retribution for third party perpetrators of heinous crimes against pregnant women and 
their fetuses.89 The creation of fetal personhood, however, seems to be a pre-textual means of 
effectuating this otherwise reasonable objective as the same result could be achieved by honoring 
female bodily autonomy and designating pregnant women as a special class of particularly 
vulnerable victim. Crimes against these victims would then be enhanced as “aggravated,” and 
penalties could correspond accordingly. 
Irrespective of policy debates, by using existing child endangerment laws and expanded 
fetal recognition, the anti-abortion movement has won important ground in its quest to eradicate 
female reproductive choice. As analyzed above, appellate scrutiny has stalled some of these 
efforts, however, and conservative jurisdictions search for a more solid foundation upon which to 
bifurcate the pregnant woman’s body against itself. The following subsection analyzes the anti-
abortion movement’s radical next step towards achieving that goal. 
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B. Tennessee’s Response: Targeted and Direct Criminalization of Pregnant Women 
Last year, Tennessee’s criminal code received a radical edition.90 As a result, pregnant 
women who suffer from substance abuse addiction now face additional and separate charges for 
drug use: criminal assault on their own bodies.91 No longer are child endangerment statutes or 
third party perpetrators needed in Tennessee. 
According to the law, a woman may be “prosecuted for assault for the illegal use of a 
narcotic drug while pregnant, if her child is born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug.”92 
Tennessee also expanded its statutory definition of “victim” in criminal assaults to include 
“viable fetus.”93 One practical effect of these changes to Tennessee’s criminal code is that 
women may now face criminal investigation for not only positive test results, but also poor birth 
outcomes since low birth weight and size happen to be, among other genetic causes, possible 
indicators of drug exposure.94 
Less than two weeks after enactment, Tennessee arrested twenty-six year old Mallory 
Loyola under the statute when her newborn tested positive for meth-amphetamines even though 
Meth is not a narcotic. In addition, no other evidence of physical harm to the baby was observed 
at the time of Ms. Loyola’s charging. Tennessee’s first case under the new law was therefore 
foreboding of the potential of prosecutorial abuse as neither of the elements required under the 
crime, a) use of narcotics, nor b) harm to the fetus, was proven by the state. Nonetheless, Loyola 
pled to a lesser misdemeanor to avoid felony prosecution and agreed to enter a drug 
rehabilitation program.  
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Loyola’s case is informative, because even though she is white, she has low socio-
economic status and therefore could not afford the protection of a private doctor nor private 
hospital, which likely would never involuntarily screen her newborn for drug exposure and 
almost certainly would not alert law enforcement if it conducted such screening.95 As previously 
discussed, defendants with limited resources like Loyola are also more likely to ultimately 
receive criminal sanction even in cases where the state lacks substantial evidence and other 
procedural defects exist.96 While Loyola is white, the economic and criminal justice realities 
analyzed in above suggest that poverty and race are close proxies in today’s America, and her 
case therefore bolsters the racial dimension of gender subordination at issue in this paper.  
 Prosecutors and law enforcement in this blatantly pro-life jurisdiction have pushed for 
this law on dual concerns.97 First, they argue that the law may help stem the supposed resurgence 
of drug use and abuse in the state, a familiar refrain for governmental institutions eager to 
entrench themselves and their political values.98 Secondly, proponents of the measure claim that 
criminal sanction serves the best interest of fetuses, a precarious class of “legal persons” yet to 
be recognized by legislation or jurisprudence on the federal level.  
 The medical community and RJ advocates like NAPW have responded on health and 
constitutional grounds. Tennessee Medical Association Director Gary Zelizer contends that “any 
kind of punitive approach, from a health care perspective, drives women underground. It doesn’t 
encourage them to get treatment.” If true, wouldn’t the exceedingly vulnerable fetus be at risk of 
greater harm in the context of maternal drug use? If driven “underground,” then pregnant women 
                                                                 
95 See NAPW, supra note 72. 
96 See Alexander, supra note 64. 
97 See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 66. 
98 Id. 
26 
 
of already limited means and their fetuses would likely make even less contact with health 
providers during the most important times of their respective lives.  
Beyond health ramifications, NAPW legal spokeswoman Farah Diaz-Tello argues that 
the statute’s scope is overly broad and brings women within the prospect of criminal 
investigations on the basis of poor birth outcomes alone. “The law itself, even though it permits 
women to be charged with misdemeanor assault, in no way limits the prosecution to 
misdemeanor assault, nor does it limit the prosecution to women who are illegally taking 
narcotics,” says Diaz-Tello. The law potentially subjects any woman whose newborn presents 
with medical complications or whose pregnancy is lost to law enforcement scrutiny so long as a 
medical provider also suspects drug use “because criminal investigation is the only way to rule 
out an unlawful act.”99 In this context, absent positive toxicology, doctors and nurses must 
determine reasonable suspicion or probable cause as quasi-agents of state law enforcement, a 
constitutionally precarious dynamic.100 
Finally, while there is no organized data yet, most RJ observers predict the trend in 
jurisdictions using child endangerment statutes to prosecute pregnant women will follow course 
in Tennessee: poor women and women of color will suffer the brunt of prosecutions under the 
new statute.101 Worse yet, Tennessee’s appellate courts will be hard-pressed to find a basis to 
reverse such prosecutions. The State’s high court, or indeed the Supreme Court of the United 
States will likely have to strike the law down on constitutional grounds since the Tennessee 
legislature has firmly rooted direct sanctions against pregnant women in its criminal code in 
unprecedented fashion.  
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Part IV.  
Proposed Solutions: Constitution Based Legal Strategies and Social Activism 
 The preservation of female reproductive autonomy and the constitutional personhood of 
pregnant women must be won by both targeted legal strategy and relentless social activism. 
Legal Challenges to Tennessee’s statute should leverage the Constitutional protections found in 
the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Social activism should raise media awareness 
in times of renewed racial unrest as extreme violence against black victims at the hands of 
civilians and law enforcement make daily headlines.102 The following subsections analyze these 
strategies in detail. 
A. Constitutional Attacks to Tennessee’s Statute  
While the Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari103 on challenges to use of child 
endangerment statutes in pregnancy drug use prosecutions, Tennessee’s explicit criminalization 
of the same offers a direct target for ultimate judicial review. Whereas appellate benches in most 
jurisdiction disposed of abusive prosecutions under endangerment law, rendering Supreme Court 
scrutiny mostly redundant, Tennessee brazenly creates a new class of “perpetrators” and 
“victims” for the “crime” of drug use, which is already covered in its criminal code. In the 
process, Tennessee has dissimulated the pregnant woman’s body from itself. Constitutional 
rights to Due Process, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Privacy are therefore implicated and 
this new class of defendant has standing to make claims against these prosecutions like never 
before. 104 
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B. Social Activism 
Social justice advocacy yields results. The Civil rights movement ended formal 
segregation and ushered the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. Legal and social activism resulted 
in the Roe decision, and subsequent advocacy yielded the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The 
ACLU and NAACP continue to pressure the criminal justice and penal systems for reform in 
police tactics, prosecutorial discretion, sentencing disparities, and the crisis of mass 
incarceration. Achievements are fragmented however, and “interested parties” continue to force 
large segments of the population into subordinate roles based on race, gender and class.  
This paper argues that individual movements have too long isolated themselves from the 
root causes of social inequity. It is time for single-issue activism to recognize that the modern 
Capitalist mode of production, supported by imperialistic military engagement internationally, 
will always yield race and gender hierarchies as proxies for class subordination. The history of 
America is a history of ruling class dominance with Native Americans, African-Americans, 
women, and later immigrant groups occupying the ranks of the lower class and the 
disenfranchised. Even today, income inequality continues to rise, state discipline continues to 
segregate and remove people of color from the political process, and female Reproductive Justice 
continues to suffer major setbacks as state action threatens to obfuscate the constitutionality of 
pregnant women as persons, and relegate them to the status of reproductive hosts. 
But these are mere manifestations of a greater pathology. Corporations and high wealth 
individuals continue to garner economic and political power and these entities shape social 
policies according to their interests. In this context, partisan politics over gay marriage, 
transgender identity, or even reproductive rights provide convenient distractions in “staged” 
media conflicts for a largely impotent body politic to consume. 
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So while targeted legal attacks on Tennessee’s statute are necessary responses to the 
symptoms of pathological inequality, social activism should and must confront the broader 
ideological crisis of the politico-economic regime: severe income inequality for the masses and 
extreme wealth accumulation for the few. Systematic rule making and power generation that 
engender inequality domestically and resource exploitation in post-colonial and conflict regions 
internationally, will perpetuate hierarchical economic arrangements and increase poverty. These 
conditions will in turn cause radicalism and social uprising both within and without. The “State” 
will then utilize violence in the form of criminalization, increasingly militaristic police action, 
and military force abroad. The cycle will continue until overconsumption and extreme opposition 
render the system unsustainable. Class equality will necessarily be valued in the system that 
follows. Race and gender status will therefore be less coveted targets for subordination. 
Social justice activism should recognize this dialectic and incorporate systematic issues 
of class and status into their analysis. Seemingly singular issues manifest in broader socio-
economic contexts, and responses to those issues should be crafted accordingly. 
Part V. 
Conclusion 
The ongoing “War” on Reproductive Justice hones its weaponry in Tennessee’s recent 
legislation. Ironically, this bold new law is also a boon to the Reproductive Justice movement 
itself. Previous endangerment prosecutions could only be practically challenged on the 
misinterpretation of definitions within those statutes. Similarly, fetal personhood recognition in 
homicide statutes were unpopular sources for RJ opposition as they were mostly aimed at 
protecting “fetal interests” against third party offenders.  
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Tennessee’s law gives RJ a tangible object for legal challenge in its explicit targeting of 
pregnant women and resultant constitutional dismembering of their bodies. Legal activism 
should confront the law as a prohibited invasion of female reproductive autonomy and 
fundamental privacy. The mechanism of enforcement should also be attacked on Due Process 
grounds as doctors and medical institutions are increasingly used as quasi-agents of law 
enforcement, medical privilege is involuntarily usurped.  
Finally, the RJ movement should fulfill the promise of its “human rights” approach to 
reproductive autonomy and join the opposition to the perpetual and sustained attack on race and 
class in an ideologically broken political regime. 
 
